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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the officers' detention of Ms, Holmes violate the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution? 
2. Did the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes violate 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in 
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, did they nevertheless violate the 
fourth amendment in seizing the roll of paper towels and its 
contents since the facts did not fit within the plain view exception? 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
vi. 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop 
and question suspect — Grounds. A peace 
officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an explanation 
of his actions. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code 
Ann.§78-2a-3(2) (f), whereby the defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment of conviction for any crime other than a first degree 
or capital felony. 
vii. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
CHARLENE ANN HOLMES : Case No. 880168-CA 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended). The 
judge found Ms. Holmes guilty on January 15, 1988, on the basis of 
evidence received during a hearing on a Motion to Suppress Evidence 
held November 20, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for the Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, presiding. See Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of September 17, 1987, Lieutenant William 
Gray and Sergeant William A. Shelton of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department were on a plainclothes assignment patrolling in an 
unmarked police car (T 26). 
At approximately 8:30 p.m./ Sgt. Shelton and Lt. Gray 
first noted a woman as she stood on the sidewalk on the west side of 
1200 South State Street talking to the male occupant of a pickup 
truck. Officers Gray and Shelton, in their unmarked car, pulled in 
behind the truck which then drove away. The woman, whom the 
officers later learned was Charlene Ann Holmes, proceeded to walk 
southbound (T. 5, 26-27). 
As Ms. Holmes continued walking south, Officers Gray and 
Shelton observed a car pull into the Veterinary Hospital parking 
lot, stopping at the entrance crossing the sidewalk. Ms. Holmes 
turned and talked to the driver. After a short conversation, the 
car departed and Ms. Holmes continued walking south before crossing 
the street at the southwest corner of 1300 South and State Street. 
She proceeded to walk south to a service station, Wayne's Car Care 
Center (T. 6-7, 27). 
At Wayne's Car Care Center, the officers observed a male 
in a small pickup truck stop and briefly converse with Ms. Holmes. 
Ms. Holmes then walked south and as she neared the southern end of 
the service station, the second of the three cars which the officers 
had earlier seen stop Ms. Holmes pulled into the station. The 
driver again conversed with Ms. Holmes and shortly thereafter she 
got into the car (T. 7-8). 
The officers followed the car as it headed southbound on 
State Street. At 1700 South, the car turned east and entered the 
west parking lot at South High School. The car exited only seconds 
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later on to 1700 South and proceeded eastbound to 300 East, entering 
the east parking lot at South High School. The car emerged moments 
later and returned to 1700 South. Driving westbound, the car turned 
at 200 East, made a U-turn and reentered 1700 South westbound to 
State Street. The car then turned north onto State Street (T. 9-10, 
28-29). 
At approximately 1500 South and State Street, Lt. Gray 
and Sgt. Shelton pulled the car over. Prior to stopping the car, 
neither officer had viewed Ms. Holmes engage in any illegal activity 
nor did they observe the driver of the car violate any traffic 
ordinances (T. 10, 29). 
Sgt. Shelton testified that he and Lieutenant Gray 
stopped the car because they figured that a prostitution deal had 
been made between the driver of the car and Ms. Holmes. Sergeant 
Shelton speculated that the deal had been made, but that the 
occupants of the car had discovered that he and Lt. Gray were police 
officers and were thus returning to State Street to drop off Ms. 
Holmes (T. 10,29). 
Sgt. Shelton, as head of the vice squad, had had no 
previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and had no information that she 
was a prostitute (T. 17). He testified that his belief that a 
prostitution deal had been made was based on his observations that 
there is a very high area of prostitution between approximately 800 
South and 2100 South on State Street (T. 5-6), that Ms. Holmes 
strolled at a very low pace, turning back and looking toward 
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traffic, that she had brief conversations with three different males 
(T. 21), and, that the route the car had taken was suspicious (T. 
10). 
After stopping the car, Sgt. Shelton approached the 
driver's side of the car and asked the driver to step out and talk 
to him (T. 11). Sergeant Shelton did not take the driver's name, 
nor did he note or record the model and make of the car or its 
license plate number (T. 24). 
Lt. Gray walked up and stood directly behind the car door 
on the passenger side where Ms. Holmes was seated (T. 30). Lt. Gray 
testified that from his vantage point, he witnessed Ms. Holmes 
remove a roll of paper towels from her purse and attempt to stuff 
them between the car console and the seat. Lt. Gray opened the door 
and asked Ms. Holmes for the roll of towels. He reached in and 
removed the towels and unrolled them on the roof of the car. He 
stated the towels contained two syringes, a spoon, and two small 
packets of mayonnaise (T. 30-31). 
Lt. Gray arrested Ms. Holmes for possession of a 
controlled substance (T. 32). The officers released the driver of 
the car. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ms. Holmes was seized when officers stopped the car in 
which she was a passenger for questioning as to whether she and the 
driver had made a prostitution deal. Because the officers lacked a 
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reasonable suspicion to justify such detention, Ms. Holmes' rights 
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution were 
violated and the evidence seized should have been suppressed. 
The seizure of Ms. Holmes also violated her rights under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the statutory 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended). 
Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in 
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, the officers nevertheless violated 
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and 
seizure when they seized a roll of paper towels which were not 
visibly linked to criminal activity, and unrolled them without 
obtaining a warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
The Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), referred 
to the Fourth Amendment's personal privacy and security safeguards 
as "sacred," with no right "more carefully guarded, by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
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control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference 
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." 
Id., at 8-9 [quoting Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250 (1891)]. The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
extends to this nation's citizens when they are on public sidewalks 
and when they are in their automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
A limited exception to the general probable cause 
requirement was created by the United States Supreme Court in Terry 
when it held that under appropriate circumstances a brief detention 
of a person, absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983). The Terry Court instructs that this limited exception is 
tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law 
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal 
security. However, in recognizing the essential protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stressed 
that in balancing these competing considerations, a central concern 
has been "to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of 
privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the 
unfettered discretion of officers in the field." Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
Thus, in justifying a particular detention, an officer 
must be able to point to specific articulable facts which, when 
viewed under an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion 
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that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491. 
This Court has reiterated the Terry Court's insistence on such a 
standard, cautioning that "[a]nything less would invite intrusions 
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has 
consistently refused to sanction. And simple 'good faith on the 
part of the arresting officer is not enough....". State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 21-22). This constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion" 
necessary to justify detention has been codified in Utah law at 
Section 77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953). Trujillo,, 739 P.2d at 88. 
The search and seizure limitations of the Fourth 
Amendment apply to "investigatory stops" or "seizures" that are less 
than official arrests. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of 
its occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 
(Utah 1983); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653. Therefore, Defendant Charlene 
Holmes' fourth amendment rights were implicated when Officers Gray 
and Shelton stopped the car in which she was a passenger and 
detained her. In this case, the information relied on by the 
officers in a decision to detain the defendant did not amount to the 
constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion. 
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It is Sergeant Shelton's testimony that he relied on four 
factors to justify a stop and detention of Charlene Holmes. 
1. The officers observed Ms. Holmes on the block of 1200 
South State Street which, they believed based on their past 
experience, is part of a very high area of prostitution extending 
from approximately 800 South to 2100 South on State Street. 
2. Ms. Holmes strolled at a very slow pace and turned 
back to look toward traffic. 
3. Ms. Holmes had short, brief conversations with three 
different males who were seated in their respective automobiles and 
then got into one of the automobiles. 
4. The "suspicious" route of the car in which Ms. Holmes 
was a passenger. 
It is Sergeant Shelton's testimony that he relied on two 
factors to justify the stop and detention of Charlene Holmes. 
(a) Ms. Holmes was in an area frequented by 
prostitutes. 
(b) Ms. Holmes talked briefly to two different males 
in their automobiles on two separate occasions, and she conversed 
briefly with a third male in whose car she was subsequently stopped 
and detained by the officers. 
The factors enumerated by the officers, singly or in 
combination, did not rise to the level indicated in the case law 
from Utah, the United States Supreme Court, and other jurisdictions, 
to justify the detention of Ms. Holmes under the fourth amendment. 
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Factor 1(a). Both officers testified that they took an 
interest in Charlene Holmes because of their belief that the area in 
which they first observed her was a "very high prostitution area." 
Although there has been little opportunity to analyze the 
"high prostitution area" factor in Utah case law, it is most 
analogous to the "high crime area" factor which was recently 
presented to this Court in State v. Trujilloy 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 
1987). In Trujillo, this Court determined that an officer's 
decision to stop the defendant was based initially on two factors, 
one of which was the high crime factor in the area. This Court held 
that the seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional — the 
detention of the defendant being unreasonable within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment. 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the 
officer cited the "high crime area" factor as one of the bases for 
his suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the defendants. 
The Utah Supreme Court's per curiam decision did not address the 
issue specifically, but since the Court held that the information 
known to the officer did not justify the stop, it can be inferred 
that the high crime area factor was insufficient to justify the 
challenged stop. See also State v. Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash. 
App. 1984). 
In State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the 
defendants were seen in a laundromat located in a high crime area at 
1:00 a.m. The officer recognized the defendants from a previous 
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criminal encounter during which a bag of coins was discovered in 
their possession. In this instance, the Court found the initial 
stop leading to the arrest as valid. However, Whittenback is 
readily distinguishable from the case now before the Court since the 
officer had previously apprehended the defendants with a bag of 
coins in their possession and there had been a rash of burglaries in 
the area of the laundromat. 
In the case now before the Court, no such previous 
contact existed. Sergeant Shelton testified that he had not had any 
previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and that as the head of the vice 
squad, he had no information that she was a prostitute (T.17). 
Consequently, there is no relationship established between Ms. 
Holmes1 prior activities and her presence in a "high prostitution 
area." 
In People v. Bower, 24 Cal.3d 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115, 119 
(Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court in addressing the "high 
crime area" factor recognized that many citizens shop, work, play, 
transact business, visit, or live in areas that have high crime 
rates. The Court noted that "[t]he spectrum of legitimate human 
behavior occurs every day in so-called high crime areas. As a 
result, this court has appraised this factor with caution and has 
been reluctant to conclude that a location's crime rate transforms 
otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances 
justifying the seizure of an individual." JEd. (citations 
omitted). The court's critical analysis of the high crime area 
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factor is consistent with the view that the attributes of a general 
social phenomena should not be imputed to an individual. 
In State v. Sery, Case No. 860333-CA, slip op., (July 27, 
1988) this Court analogized Mr. Sery's arrival from Florida as a 
basis for a reasonable suspicion to the testimony in State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), that interstate 15 was often used 
by illegal aliens from Mexico. Id. at 18. This Court found that 
the fact that a person embarked from a flight which originated in 
Florida did not amount to an objective fact upon which a reasonable 
suspicion could be based just as the fact that a person was 
traveling on 1-15 did not support a reasonable suspicion in 
Mendoza. This Court noted: 
In Mendoza, the court considered it unlikely that 
illegal alien transporters comprised a significant 
portion of 1-15 traffic. It seems equally unlikely that 
drug couriers comprise a significant portion of the 
travelers through Salt Lake International airport, 
even of those whose flight originated in Florida. 
Id. at 18. Applying the analysis of Mendoza and Sery to the instant 
case, it seems just as unlikely that persons who have entered into 
illegal prostitution agreements comprise a significant portion of 
the people on State Street, and information that a woman was walking 
on State Street between 2100 South and 800 South is not a fact upon 
which a constitutionally sound reasonable suspicion that a woman was 
involved in criminal activity could be based. 
In the case before the Court, the defendant, a female, 
was walking down the street in an area deemed by Officers Shelton 
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and Gray to be a "very high prostitution area"; an area, as 
described by the officers, which encompasses approximately fifteen 
city blocks, daily the site of heavy pedestrian and automobile 
traffic. A woman should not be subject to seizure simply because 
she is present in an area which has a high incidence of 
prostitution. That an area has a high occurrence of prostitution 
does not qualify itself as a specific articulable fact imputing a 
reasonable suspicion of criminality to an individual woman. 
Factor 2. Sergeant Shelton alone testified that the 
defendant's walk and accompanying backward glance were significant 
factors in his decision to stop and detain her. The allegedly 
suspicious walk of Ms. Holmes was no more than her walking at a very 
slow pace, or "strolling" and looking back towards traffic — as 
described by Sergeant Shelton. (T.21) 
Although this Court has "acknowledged] that a trained 
law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the 
untrained observer," and furthermore, "[t]he officer is entitled to 
assess the facts in light of his experience." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 
88-89; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564-565 (1980), 
this Court has also re-emphasized that it is "imperative that the 
facts be judged against an objective standard[ ]" which would 
"warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the 
action taken was appropriate!.]" Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Sergeant Shelton's interpretation of Ms, Holmes' walk and 
alleged head movements is purely subjective. There is no objective 
standard which one could possibly utilize to determine whether one 
was strolling, walking at a very slow pace, at just a slow pace, at 
a slow pace, at a medium pace, at a fast pace. Assuming arguendo 
that there is probative value in such a determination, it would fail 
the objective test as enunciated by the Terry Court and followed by 
this Court. 
Indeed, the subjective nature of Sergeant Shelton's 
observation of Ms. Holmes' walk and the conclusions derived 
therefrom, is illustrated by the testimony of his partner that 
evening. Lieutenant Gray stated that although in his opinion she 
walked a little slowly, there was otherwise nothing unusual about 
her walk. The following exchange occurred during cross-examination 
of Lieutenant Gray: 
Q. Did you see her (Ms. Holmes) walk down State Street? 
A. Yes 
Q. Did she walk in a normal fashion? 
A. She walked a little slow, in my opinion, but 
other than that, nothing unusual. 
Q. Okay, no flirting gestures? 
A. Not that I observed. 
(T.35) Lieutenant Gray's opinion that there was nothing unusual 
about Ms. Holmes' walk and his lack of reliance on the manner in 
which Ms.Holmes walked down the street to justify the determination 
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to stop and detain Ms. Holmes is strengthened by his twenty years 
experience in police work. 
The unordinary "pace" and "meaning" of Ms. Holmes1 walk 
is entirely subjective and not an objective indication of criminal 
intent to be used to justify police detention. To find otherwise 
could conceivably subject every law-abiding citizen to the 
"unfettered discretion" of law enforcement officials, in violation 
of the fourth amendment. 
Factor 3b. Both officers testified that their interest 
in Ms. Holmes was aroused because they observed her having short, 
brief conversations with three different males seated in their 
respective automobiles and that Ms. Holmes got into one of the 
automobiles. 
Ms. Holmes' "brief conversations" as a basis for the 
formation of an articulable suspicion on the officers' part is 
similarly subject to the objective difficulties discussed above. As 
to these brief conversations, Sergeant Shelton testified that as Ms. 
Holmes walked down the street, three separate cars pulled up 
alongside her and they briefly conversed. Sergeant Shelton 
testified in regard to these conversations that Ms. Holmes did not 
motion to any car or wave the cars over; Ms. Holmes did not yell at 
the cars; nor did they observe Ms. Holmes initiate the 
conversations. (T. 18-20). 
Sergeant Shelton further testified that he could not hear 
anything that was said in the conversations; he did not know the 
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identity of Ms. Holmes or the identity of any of the three different 
drivers; he did not know what occurred in the conversations prior to 
Ms. Holmes' ride in the car. JCcL T h e result is that the officers 
lacked an objective basis to formulate an articulable suspicion 
arising from separate conversations between four unknown 
individuals. According to the officers' testimony/ at no time did 
they possess any knowledge as to the purpose, context, or content of 
the conversations "observed" between Charlene Holmes and the three 
individuals. 
Ms. Holmes was engaged in short conversations with three 
men in cars as she walked down State Street, an occurrence which is 
not at all peculiar as pointed out by Sergeant Shelton during 
cross-examination: 
Q. You [Sergeant Shelton] have driven up and down 
State Street a number of times, I take it? 
A. A lot, yes. 
Q. It is not unusual at all on any night of the 
week to see a young woman talking to other 
people in cars, is it? 
A. No. 
Q. Happens hundreds of times from 3rd South to 21st 
South on State Street every night of the week? 
A. I can't talk about 21st to 3rd. I am not really 
that familiar with that part of the street. That 
is out of my jurisdiction. 
-15-
Q. Well, within your jurisdiction, whatever that is. 
It is the kind of thing that happens hundreds of 
times a night on State Street, does it not? 
A. Yes, it does. 
(T. 20-21) 
Objectively, there is nothing to distinguish the brief 
moments of conversation between the defendant and the three drivers 
from "the kind of thing that happens hundred of times a night on 
State Street." (JEcL ) The fourth amendment acts essentially as a 
standard of "reasonableness" in order to guard "the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions" by government 
officials, including law enforcement agents. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
653-654. 
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52, the Court concluded 
that there were no adequate grounds to form a reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct because, "[i]n 
short, the [defendant's] activity was no different from the activity 
of other pedestrians in that neighborhood." rd.; See Trujillo, 739 
P.2d at 90. There was no knowledge provided to the officers from 
Ms. Holmes1 alleged conversations by which one could reasonably 
differentiate Ms. Holmes from other pedestrians in the area. 
Evaluated under an objective test, the alleged conversations between 
Ms. Holmes and the three drivers do not give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion. 
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Sergeant Shelton stated that the route taken by the car 
in which Ms. Holmes was a passenger contributed to his decision to 
stop the vehicle and detain the passengers. Sergeant Shelton 
testified that the car's route also included momentarily pulling 
into two different parking lots. Sergeant Shelton further testified 
that he did not observe the car make any traffic violations (T. 
22). On the other hand, Lieutenant Gray's testimony did not specify 
that the route of the automobile in question was relied upon by him 
to justify the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes (T. 29, 36-37). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 
(Utah 1986) was presented with the stop of an automobile in which 
one of the factors claimed to justify the stop and detention was the 
manner in which the car was driven. The officer observed the slow 
moving carf with out-of-state license plates at 3:00 a.m. in an area 
in which a recent rash of burglaries had occurred. The Court's 
analysis took into account the fact that the officer had not 
observed any criminal or traffic offense while he followed the car 
for three blocks. It was the Court's finding that the officer had 
no objective facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that the 
car's two occupants were involved in criminal activity. 
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah, 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court directly addressed the "route of travel" factor 
stating that "it had little probative value in determining if the 
officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle." Id. at 
4. Furthermore, the Court noted that the "erratic driving behavior" 
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(the subsequent lane change and rapid deceleration at the approach 
of the patrol car) could not be interpreted to give rise to a 
suspicion that the occupants of the car were engaged in illegal 
activity. J^ d. at 4-5. 
In Sery, the Court compared the State's reliance on Mr. 
Sery's behavior in sitting down in a phone booth twice then standing 
up and looking over the partition, and subsequently leaving the 
booth by a "strange" path to the State's reliance on an "erratic" 
driving pattern in Mendoza. Sery, slip. op. at 19. This Court 
determined that Mr. Sery's behavior did not amount to an objective 
fact upon which a reasonable suspicion could be based, pointing out 
that the officer "did not say how this behavior varies from that of 
any other arriving passenger . . .". Id. 
In the present case, the officers observed the car in 
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger in an area of heavy traffic. 
Neither officer observed any criminal behavior before or after the 
car turned from the south bound direction on State street to the 
north bound direction on State Street when they stopped the car. 
The officers did not articulate any objective facts to support the 
speculation that the manner in which the car was driven served to 
provide a reasonable suspicion that a "prostitution deal" had been 
made between Ms. Holmes and the driver of the car or that the car 
was driven any differently from other cars cruising State Street. In 
fact, Sergeant Shelton testified the he pulled the car over because 
he "figured" that a prostitution deal had been made and that the 
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driver had decided that they were police and he was going to return 
and drop off Ms. Holmes. Sergeant Shelton acknowledged that his 
scenario was conjecture on his part (T. 10). In addition the car 
was unmarked and the officers were in plain clothes suggesting it 
was difficult for the occupants of the car to have known they were 
being followed by officers if, in fact, they realized that they were 
being followed at all.1 Furthermore, it is indicative of the nature 
of the stop that the officers released the driver without getting 
his name, the model and make of the car, and the license plate 
number (T. 24). 
The four factors relied upon by the officers to justify 
the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes, when analyzed singly, do not 
constitute specific articulable facts which create a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime had taken place or was about to take place. 
Furthermore, nothing concerning the cumulation of the factors makes 
them more persuasive in support of a conclusion that the officers1 
suspicion was reasonable under the fourth amendment. The specified 
factors do not "mysteriously become imbued with an aura of guilt 
merely by viewing them in their totality. Four times zero, in 
arithmetic, still equals zero." People v. Loewen 35 Cal.3d 117, 672 
P.2d 436, 444 (Cal. 1983) (quoting People v. Gale 9 Cal. 3d 788, 
511 P.2d 1204 (Cal. 1973) (dis.opn. of Mosk, J.)) 
1
 The State offered no testimony that either Ms. Holmes 
or the driver turned around to look at them or repeatedly checked 
the rear view mirror. 
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Because the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the 
detention violated the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. It is well settled that when the seizure and 
detention of the defendant is without the evidentiary justification 
required by the fourth amendment of the Constitution, the resulting 
evidence from the misconduct must be excluded from criminal trials. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. See also Trujillo, 739 P.2d. 85 Utah App. 
1988). 
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from Ms. Holmes should 
have been suppressed. Ms. Holmes respectfully requests that such 
evidence be suppressed, her conviction reversed, and the matter 
remanded for dismissal or a new trial without the illegally seized 
evidence. 
POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah is free to analyze search and seizure cases under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differently from case 
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law which is based on an interpretation of the fourth amendment to 
the United States constitution. In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court inferred that a separate 
analysis of search and seizure cases under the Utah Constitution, 
article I, section 14 is warranted. IQ. at 129 n.l. See also State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986). 
In State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (Wash. 1984), the 
Washington Supreme Court characterized the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the federal constitution as "guidance" in 
construing the Washington Constitution. The Myrick Court stated 
that, "[w]hile we may turn to the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the United States Constitution for guidance in establishing a 
hierarchy of values and principles under the Washington 
Constitution, we rely, in the final analysis, upon our own legal 
foundations in determining its scope and effect." Id. 
Illustratively, the Washington Supreme Court found that the 
Washington Constitution provided greater protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by police to the people of 
Washington than did the federal constitution. State v. Jackson, 688 
P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984) . 
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that it 
should "construe Alaska's constitutional provisions such as Article 
I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to those granted by the 
United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution." state 
v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985). In Jones, the Court 
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approved a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under 
Alaska law than is required under the federal constitution. 
Assuming arguendo that the factors relied upon by the 
officers supported a detention of Ms. Holmes not in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution, this Court may 
impose a more rigorous test to determine what constitutes reasonable 
suspicion under the Utah constitution. The facts of the present 
case should not support a justifiable intrusion of the protections 
granted to Ms. Holmes under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
constitution and thus the evidence that flowed from the unlawful 
seizure should have been suppressed. 
POINT III. EVEN IF THE STOP WERE LAWFUL, THE OFFICERS 
VIOLATED MS. HOLMES1 RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE WHEN THEY SEIZED THE ROLL OF PAPER TOWELS AND 
UNWRAPPED IT. 
Assuming arguendo that the officers made a rightful stop 
and that consequently Lieutenant Gray was in a position where he was 
entitled to be, evidence obtained was nevertheless the result of an 
illegal search and seizure. 
In State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "warrantless seizures and searches are per 
se unreasonable unless the exigencies of the situation justify an 
exception." J[<3. at 123, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967); see also State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983); State 
v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). One exception specified by the 
-22-
Cole Court to the warrant requirement is the doctrine that "objects 
within the plain view of an officer from a position where he is 
entitled to be are not the subject of an 
unlawful search." Cole, 674 P.2d at 123 [citations omitted]. 
The "plain view doctrine" requires (1) lawful presence of 
the officer which is incident to a lawful intrusion; (2) evidence 
which is in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly 
incriminating. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). The Kelly Court further 
explained that the third requirement that evidence be "clearly 
incriminating" means that there is "probable cause to associate the 
property with criminal activity." Kelly, 718 P.2d at 390 (quoting 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-742 (1983) (plurality opinion)). 
Probable cause requires that an officer "have a reasonable belief 
that the object viewed may be contraband or stolen property or 
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that 
such a belief be correct. . . " Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. 
The object viewed by Lieutenant Gray consisted of a roll 
of paper towels (T. 31). In his testimony, Lieutenant Gray attached 
special significance to the paper towels and a roll of paper towels 
alone does not provide probable cause to associate the towels with 
criminal behavior. The only basis for a finding that the paper 
towels were "clearly incriminating evidence" provided by Lieutenant 
Gray to justify his seizure was that he "felt she (Ms. Holmes) was 
attempting to hide something from us." IQ. The inference from the 
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officer's testimony is that the paper towels became "clearly 
incriminating evidence" from his observation of Ms. Holmes removing 
the towels from her purse and "stuffing" them between a console and 
the car sear (T. 30). 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court examined a "furtive movement" subsequent to the approach of a 
police officer. In Trujillo, the officer saw the defendant shift 
his knapsack from his side to his front in a way considered by the 
officer to be an effort of concealment. When the officer 
approached, the defendant placed the knapsack next to a garbage can, 
an act which the officer regarded as an effort to "stash" the 
knapsack. 
This Court noted that the officer did not observe Mr. 
Trujillo engage in any criminal conduct nor did the officer inquire 
about the "suspicious" placement of the knapsack before subjecting 
Mr. Trujillo to the search which yielded a concealed weapon. 
Furthermore, this Court pointed out that the officer never 
articulated what concerned him about the knapsack. J^ d. at 86-89. 
In the present case, the officers did not observe Ms. 
Holmes engage in any criminal conduct, nor did Lieutenant Gray 
inquire about the "suspicious" placement of the paper towels before 
reaching inside the car and taking them. Similar to the facts of 
Trujillo, the officer only articulated a suspicion that Ms. Holmes 
was "attempting to hide something from us" to justify the seizure 
and search of the paper towels (T. 31). 
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The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Texas v. 
Brown 460 U.S. 730 (1983), suggests that an officer must articulate 
more than a subjective interpretation of a furtive movement in order 
to justify a seizure. In Brown, the officer testified that his 
seizure of a balloon from the defendant was based on his knowledge 
that balloons tied in the manner of the one seized were frequently 
used to carry narcotics. The officer's testimony of illicit drug 
practices was corroborated by a police department chemist. In 
addition, the seizure was based on other contents of the car which 
further suggested possession of illicit substances. _ld. at 
742-743. In the instant case, where the visible item itself was not 
tied to criminal activity and the officer articulated only a 
subjective interpretation of an action, the seizure of the roll of 
paper towels and all articles within was not justified. 
Assuming arguendo that the seizure of the rolled up paper 
towel was legal, the officer effected an illegal search by unrolling 
the paper towels on the roof of the car in order to ascertain its 
contents. A closed container may not be opened without a warrant, 
even when the container is in plain view and the officer has 
probable cause to believe contraband is concealed within. United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In his concurrence in Brown, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens wrote: 
"if there is probable cause to believe it 
contains contraband, the owner's possesory 
interest in the container must yield to 
society's interest in making sure that the 
contraband does not vanish during the time 
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it would take to obtain a warrant. The item 
may be seized temporarily. It does not follow, 
however, that the container may be opened on 
the spot. Once the container is in custody, 
there is no risk that evidence will be destroyed 
Some inconvenience to the officer is entailed 
by requiring him to obtain a warrant before 
opening the container, but that alone does not 
excuse the duty to go before a neutral magistrate. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Brown, 460 U.S. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Nor do the contents of the rolled paper towel in the 
present case fall within the distinctive configuration variation of 
the plain view doctrine. Pursuant to the "distinctive configuration 
variation" the contents of a container are considered to be within 
the searching officer's view because the distinctive configuration 
of the container proclaims its contents. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 
119, 124 (Utah 1983); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
The Cole Court found that a gun case inferred its contents due to 
its distinctive configuration. Cole, 674 P.2d at 124; Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
The contents of the rolled paper towel could not be 
ascertained by its configuration. A rolled paper towel could 
contain an infinite variety of items, if anything at all. Thus, the 
rolled paper towel does not invoke the distinctive configuration 
variation of the plain view doctrine. Therefore, Lieutenant Gray, 
even if justified in the seizure of the paper towels, effected an 
illegal search by not then obtaining a warrant to ascertain the 
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contents of the rolled towel as was within his power and which is 
required by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from within the rolled 
paper towels should be suppressed and Ms. Holmes requests that her 
conviction be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial 
absent the illegally seized evidence, or dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Holmes 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's 
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial 
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the 
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this //^) day of August, 1988. 
Qr/Lu-u—. 
C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
^dfo-e.Ldsx 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme court, State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84114, this day of August, 1988. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day of 
August, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
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CHARLENE HOLMES, 
Defendant, 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. CR87-1379 
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
The defendant, CHARLENE HOLMES, by and through her attorney 
of record, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby moves this court to suppress 
all evidence obtained by the State in this case subsequent to the 
time that the defendant was illegally stopped and detained by the 
police officers on September 17, 1987 in violation of her State and 
Federal constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and 
seizures. 
Therefore, the defendant requests that this court suppress 
all evidence in the above entitled case. 
/7f( 
DATED this / £ day of November, 1987. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
io>,' 13 V.;Ji UIW Id 
C. BRADSHAW 
:torney for Defendant 
000(317 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
Please take notice that the above entitled hearing will be 
heard before the Honorable JAMES S. SAWAYA at his courtroom on 
the &Jtt day of V W W M . 1987, at the hour of 9:00 jC.m. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
7ft 
DATED this l^-1 day of November, 1987. 
ES C. BRADSHAW 
torney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of November, 1987. 
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